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1. Introduction 
Section 175 of the Haryana Panchayati Act, 1994, states that any 
person who falls within the criteria laid down under this Section 
will be disqualified from contesting elections, further, those falling 
within the ambit of Section 175, will have to resign if they already 
hold office. Additionally, the Haryana Panchayati Raj 
(Amendment) Act, 2015 added five more grounds of 
disqualification, these are: 
1. Persons against whom charges are framed in criminal cases 
for offences punishable with imprisonment for not less than 
ten years 
2. Persons who fail to pay arrears, if any, owed by them to 
either a Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society or 
District Central Cooperative Bank or District Primary 
Agricultural Rural Development Bank 
3. Persons who have arrears of electricity bills 
4. Persons who do not possess the specified educational 
qualification and lastly 
5. Persons not having a functional toilet at their place of 
residence. 
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The petitioners in the present case were individuals interested in 
contesting in the local panchayat elections but would be unable to 
do so now as they fall within the grounds stated under Section 
175.They approached the honourable Supreme Court claiming 
infringement of Section 14 of the Constitution of India, as the 
amendment created an artificial classification among voters. 
Further, they stated that the imposition of the Amendment Act, 
2015 was arbitrary and served no legitimate purpose. 
The hallmark of a vibrant democracy is the participation of 
majority of the people, as voters as well as candidates, In the 
elections to the Parliament, State Legislatures, Municipalities or 
Panchayats. Such involvement is an elementary right based on rule 
of law that is available to legal residents of a democracy. Law 
makers cannot introduce additional disqualifications that curtail 
the scope of involvement of the common people as such a 
determination is precarious to the very existence of democracy. It is 
for this reason that the power of the Parliament or the State 
Legislature to add disqualifications not included in the 
Constitution, was strongly opposed in the Constituent Assembly 
Debates. However, eventually it was asserted that for elections to 
the State Legislatures, the power to create additional 
disqualifications should only rest with the Parliament and not with 
the State Legislature. Therefore, Article 84 and Article 102 of the 
Constitution provide qualifications and disqualifications 
correspondingly for members of Parliament in the Lok Sabha and 
Rajya Sabha. Similarly, Article 173 and Article 191 provide 
qualifications and disqualifications for State Legislatures. 
The Constitution of India under Article 243 F (1) provides for 
disqualifications from membership of the Panchayat. Additionally, 
under Article 243 F(1)(b),the State Legislature has enacted the 
Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.Section 175 of this Act provides 
for disqualifications from membership in the Panchayat. These 
disqualifications were further extended by the Haryana Panchayati 
Raj (Amendment) Act, 2015, and was subsequently challenged in 
Rajbala v. State of Haryana.1 By the Amendment Act, 2015, five 
categories of persons were disallowed from contesting in the 
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elections to the Panchayat. These categories are “(a) persons against 
whom charges are framed in criminal cases for offences punishable 
with imprisonment for not less than ten years, (b) persons who fail 
to pay arrears, if any, owed by them to either a Primary 
Agricultural Cooperative Society or a District Central Cooperative 
Bank or a District Primary Agricultural Rural Development Bank, 
(c)persons who have arrears of electricity bills, (d) persons who do 
not possess the specified educational qualification and lastly (e) 
persons not having a functional toilet at their place of residence.”2 
2. Panchayati Raj: Conception and Misconception 
The objectives behind bringing in the 73rd and 74th Amendments3 
of the Constitution were to involve participation of people at the 
grass root level, in the development of the country. The main focus 
of these amendments was to emphasize on issues like shelter, 
poverty unemployment, illiteracy at the ground level, and further 
to enable redressal of such matters by the masses themselves. 
Certainly, an individual who is elected as a representative of the 
Gram Sabha at Panchayat level must be one who is conscious of 
these difficulties so that he can contribute to the decision making at 
the Panchayat level and execute such arrangements and guidelines 
which are mentioned in Schedule XI of the Indian Constitution. In 
order to realise this, there should be broad decentralization of 
powers by the State Legislatures, by sanctioning the Gram Sabha/ 
Panchayat as entities of self-governance. Representation at the 
Panchayat level is essential and imposing blocks based on financial 
capacity, living standard, literacy and other similar factors will ruin 
adult suffrage by disallowing a large portion of the population 
from contesting elections. Moreover, one of the objectives of the 
73rd amendment is to reduce the “inadequate representation of 
weaker sections of the society like Women, Scheduled Tribes and 
Scheduled Castes.” A statutory amendment has to be consistent 
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with the objectives of the Constitutional Amendment or a provision 
authorising such a statute should be in connection with the 
objectives. It has now been established by cases that it should be 
left to the voters to decide the significance of educational 
qualifications of a candidate.4 Therefore, it is the decision of the 
voter that is significant5 and the Legislature cannot introduce 
qualifications that curb their right to expression, guaranteed under 
Article 19(1)(a) of Indian Constitution.  
3. Educational Qualifications to Contest Elections 
The educational qualification provided by the impugned 
Amendment Act, 2015 is that a male candidate should be a 
graduate of class XII, a candidate who is a woman or belonging to a 
Scheduled Caste should have passed middle school. Further, 
Scheduled Caste women candidates should be a graduate of class 
V. Keeping in view that “the rural population in the State of 
Haryana is 1.65 crores out of which 96 lakhs are above 20 years of 
age, with the passing of the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) 
Act, 2015, only 57 per cent of this population will be eligible to 
contest in Panchayati elections of Haryana. More than half the 
entire population of women in Haryana cannot contest in these 
local elections, while 68 per cent of the Scheduled Caste women 
and 41 per cent of the Scheduled Caste men will be ineligible to 
contest.”6 A court of law is required to give due importance to 
legislative intent while analyzing a law7. The Court and the State 
admitted that the number of persons who will be disenfranchised 
by this Amendment Act is not clear. As the provision cannot be 
taken to mean that the condition for all contestants is passing class 
V, the whole provision is liable to be struck down. Thus, the 
provision is not only capricious and irrational, but is also 
discriminatory, there by encroaching Article 14 of the Constitution. 
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Justice Chelameshwar affirmed that, “It is only education which 
gives a human being the power to discriminate between right and 
wrong, good and bad” and it is disheartening to note that the 
Justice sees only education as a rational connection to sustain the 
Amendment. Referring to the Constituent Assembly Debate on 
whether education is an essential criterion for contesting elections, 
the following observation outlines the intention of the Constitution 
makers: 
Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer: “Firstly, in spite of the 
ignorance and illiteracy of the large mass of the 
Indian people, the Assembly has adopted the 
principle of adult franchise with an abundant faith 
in the common man and the ultimate success of 
democratic rule and in the full belief that the 
introduction of democratic government on the basis 
of adult suffrage will bring enlightenment and 
promote the well-being, the standard of life, the 
comfort and the decent living of the common man. 
The principle of adult suffrage was adopted in no 
light-hearted mood but with the full realisations of 
its implications. If democracy is to be broad based 
and the system of governments that is to function is 
to have the ultimate sanction of the people as a 
whole, in a country where the large mass of the 
people are illiterate and the people owning property 
are so few, the introduction of any property or 
educational qualifications for the exercise of the 
franchise would be a negation of the principles of 
democracy. If any such qualifications were 
introduced, that would have disfranchised a large 
number of the labouring classes and a large number 
of women-folk. It cannot after all be assumed that a 
person with a poor elementary education and with a 
knowledge of the three Rupees is in a better position 
to exercise the franchise than a labourer, a cultivator 
or a tenant who may be expected to know what his 
interests are and to choose his representatives. 
Possibly a large-scale universal suffrage may also 
have the effect of rooting out corruption what may 




turn out incidental to democratic election. This 
Assembly deserves to be congratulated on adopting 
the principle of adult suffrage and it may be stated 
that never before in the history of the world has such 
an experiment been so boldly undertaken. The only 
alternative to adult suffrage was some kind of 
indirect election based upon village community or 
local bodies and by constituting them into electoral 
colleges, the electoral colleges being elected on the 
basis of adult suffrage. That was not found 
feasible.”8 
The amendment leaves one with a troubling question, “Whether 
the State of Haryana, when more than half the adult population is 
systematically and structurally disenfranchised, continues to be a 
democratic or not?”9 Such organized disenfranchisement is not 
novel to either the State or the Apex Court. Haryana has previously 
passed laws that stop those who have living children exceeding 
two years of age from contesting for definite Panchayati posts. 
These laws were upheld by the Supreme Court in Javed v. State of 
Haryana,10 which the Court in the present case has significantly 
relied on. “Now that such laws have been judicially legitimized 
and even encouraged by India’s Apex Court, there is the possibility 
that this trend of disenfranchisement will spread to other States. 
For instance, Rajasthan had passed an Ordinance (approved by the 
Governor in December, 2014) which makes similar educational 
qualifications as a prerequisite for contesting in the Panchayat 
elections of the State. Other State governments are likely to be 
motivated by these developments.”11 
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12/12/2015). 
Unanza Gulzar                                                                             Case Comment 
89 
 
The Supreme Court again in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. 
Union of India,12 considered whether education should be a part of 
the declaration made by a candidate.  
Rejecting such a proposition, the Hon’ble Court observed that, 
Consistent with the principle of adult suffrage, the 
Constitution has not prescribed any educational 
qualification for being a Member of the House of the 
People or Legislative Assembly. That apart, I am 
inclined to think that the information relating to 
educational qualifications of contesting candidates 
does not serve any useful purpose in the present 
context and scenario. It is a well-known fact that 
barring a few exceptions, most of the candidates 
elected to Parliament or the State Legislatures are 
fairly educated even if they are not Graduates or 
Post-Graduates. To think of illiterate candidates is 
based on a factually incorrect assumption. To say 
that well-educated persons such as those having 
graduate and post- graduate qualifications will be 
able to serve the people better and conduct 
themselves in a better way inside and outside the 
House is nothing but overlooking the stark realities. 
The experience and events in public life and the 
Legislatures have demonstrated that the dividing 
line between the well-educated and less educated 
from the point of view of his/her calibre and culture 
is rather thin. Much depends on the character of the 
individual, the sense of devotion to duty and the 
sense of concern to the welfare of the people. These 
characteristics are not the monopoly of well-
educated persons.13 
A complete Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined 
whether education should be obligatory as a disqualification in 
contesting elections to the Parliament or Provincial Assembly. The 
                                                          
12People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,(2013) 10 S.C.C. 1. 
13 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003)4 S.C.C. 399. 




Pakistan Supreme Court in Muhammad Nasir Mahmood and Another 
v. Federation of Pakistan,14 looked into the legislative provisions of 
almost thirty developing/developed countries including 
Argentina, Japan, Australia, Bangladesh, Iran, Italy, etc. where 
education is not a disqualification. In most of these countries, a 
person who is qualified to vote is also entitled to contest. The 
Pakistan Supreme Court noted that the qualification ran afoul since 
it did not consider the social and economic conditions of Pakistan 
and the impact it had on the people while disentitling them from 
exercising the universal right of suffrage. It also noted that 
educational qualification as a condition for contesting elections is 
not present in other countries and such an inclusion would be 
against the spirit of democracy as enshrined in different 
instruments of the United Nations. It was further held that denial 
of the right of voters to contest elections is against the spirit of 
democracy. The Supreme Court also mentioned that the attainment 
of a qualification is dependent upon physical conditions and the 
milieu in which a person may find himself. For instance, the urban 
population has an upper hand in the sphere of education. It also 
noted that the State has failed in fulfilling its obligation of 
imparting education to all the citizens as required by Article 37 of 
the Pakistan Constitution. It concluded by holding that rendering a 
vast majority of population ineligible to contest by imposing the 
requirement of educational qualification is unjust and 
unconstitutional; it is neither a reasonable restriction nor a 
reasonable classification and therefore it is void.”15 
A simple understanding of the subsequent passage in Rajbala is 
sufficient to comprehend the confusion of the law that has been 
highlighted in the judgment: 
If it is constitutionally permissible to debar certain 
classes of people from seeking to occupy the 
constitutional offices, numerical dimension of such 
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classes, in our opinion should make no difference for 
determining whether prescription of such 
disqualification is constitutionally permissible 
unless the prescription is of such nature as would 
frustrate the constitutional scheme by resulting in a 
situation where holding of elections to these various 
bodies becomes completely impossible. 
Due to inaccessibility and poverty, people are unable to provide 
schooling to their families. According to a UNICEF report, it was 
observed that out of the 120 million children who are out of 
schools, most of them belong to poor families or are minorities.16 
Education as a goal for a welfare state is commendable, but 
education as a qualification for contesting elections cannot be made 
mandatory as such a field has a direct connection to democratic 
participation. Therefore, the argument of the State that these days 
Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly are 
educated, notwithstanding education not being a condition, is a 
self-beating contention. If the welfare State makes an attempt to 
ensure that everyone is educated, the condition is satisfied without 
having to announce it as a debarment. Thus, education as a 
qualification should not be made mandatory when it takes away 
the rights of citizens in a democracy. Consequently, the whole 
methodology by the State of Haryana is defective and lawfully 
unmaintainable. 
Additionally, the state has not shown any material before the Court 
to establish that the Act is based on the notion that educated 
members of the Panchayat are better suited to fulfil their 
responsibilities. Such an action of the State is capricious, irrational 
and violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which stipulates 
that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law 
or equal protection of the law. In the present instance, it is observed 
that the state is denying the uneducated members of the Panchayat 
the equal opportunity of contesting elections. The grounds laid 
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down by the amendment are arbitrary, hence the bar created 
through the amendment violates Article 14. 
The only contention which has been put forth by the State is that 
representatives of the Panchayat have to discharge definite 
responsibilities for which it is essential that they are educated. 
However, no rationalization has been put forth as to why there is 
no educational qualification either for Members of Parliament, 
Members of Legislative Assembly, Vice-President and President, 
who have to discharge profound tasks of state significance. The fact 
is that all these significant statutory representatives have been 
satisfactorily performing their tasks without the imposition of 
educational conditions as a disqualification. The fact that a 
candidate contesting elections at the grass root level has to be more 
educated than a candidate contesting to be a Member of Parliament 
or a Member of Legislative Assembly is irrational. 
4.  Right to Vote and Contest Elections 
The Supreme Court relying on People’s Union for Civil Liberties 
(PUCL) & Another v. Union of India & Another17 and the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Chelameshwar in Desiya Murpokku Dravida 
Kazhagam & Another v. Election Commission of India,18 inferred that 
the right to vote and right to contest are both constitutional rights 
and not statutory rights. After deciding that the right to contest is a 
constitutional right, the level of exploration that had to be engaged 
by the Court would have to be amply advanced, as the State cannot 
be permitted to take away rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
without a compelling interest. Though this compelling interest or a 
rational nexus was not shown by the State, the Court went on to 
validate the legislation. 
The two-judge bench in Rajbala has overlooked the five-judge 
bench decision of Kuldip Nayyar v. Union of India19 which positively 
specified that the right to vote in an election and the right to contest 
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an election are both statutory rights and not constitutional rights. 
Stare decisis and judicial decency requires that the two-judge bench 
when questioning the judgement made by a bench of a greater 
strength or if differing from it, must refer this significant query to a 
greater bench so that the query may be answered. It has been 
established in the matter of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra 
Community v. State of Maharashtra20 that the law laid by the Supreme 
Court in a judgment brought by a bench of greater strength is 
mandatory on any succeeding bench of smaller or co-equal strength 
and that a bench of smaller quorum cannot question the exactness 
of the opinion of law taken by a bench of greater quorum. Thus, it 
is disquieting that the two-judge Bench in Rajbala was ignorant of 
the judgment in Kuldip Nayyar. 
5. Impact of the Judgment 
The effect of the judgment is that it will prevent many people in the 
State from contesting elections and will affect people’s right to vote. 
After the Supreme Court upheld the Haryana Panchayati Raj 
(Amendment) Act, 2015, elections were successfully conducted in 
Haryana in 2016.  This election defeated the objectives of the73rd 
and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, which were enacted to 
involve participation of people at grass root level in the process of 
the country’s development. By going against the envisioned 
objective of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, the 
Haryana Panchayati Raj Amendment Act, 2015 has put the 
oppressed and downtrodden sections of the society back to the 
position that they were in earlier. Disenfranchisement is not a new 
abstraction as the said State had earlier passed a law that prevents a 
person from contesting for Panchayat elections, if they have two 
children, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in the much-
disapproved case of Javed v. State of Haryana.21  Such regulations 
have been judicially legitimized and even fortified by India’s Apex 
Court as was done in the state of Rajasthan. The Rajasthan 
Government passed an ordinance mandating requirement of 
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educational qualification for contesting election which was 
approved by the Governor in 2014, December. Similarly, the Bihar 
Assembly also inserted a clause through an amendment to the 
Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 making it compulsory for the 
candidates contesting elections in August 2015 to have toilets at 
home. However, the Bihar Cabinet withdrew this clause later. 
There is a likelihood that this tendency of disfranchisement will 
spread to other states too, which will seek such qualifications for 
contesting in the Panchayat elections. Moreover, to run a 
democratic country, there must be a choice given to the voter to 
decide the relevance of education of a candidate. Further, the 
deprived and troubled cannot afford to be educated because of 
economic and social reasons. It is imperative that the issue is 
considered by a larger bench of the Supreme Court and must also 
be looked into by the government, as it runs contrary to the spirit of 
the Constitution. 
6. Conclusion 
The most significant feature of the case is that the Court has 
overlooked affected individuals at the grass root level. When the 
State has not efficiently proceeded to develop the areas of illiteracy 
and sanitation, it is unfair to shift the burden to the oppressed and 
penalize them by taking away their democratic right of contesting 
elections. Paradoxically, what the Court has done is take away the 
prospect of empowered persons in the inferior classes of society to 
give the upcoming generations an opportunity of being educated. 
By this, the inferior classes and castes get repressed further, as they 
have no representation and their voices are never heard. If their 
involvement is obstructed by the legislature at the ground level, 
change that could have been affected would never arise and would 
end in an infinite cycle of hopelessness. 
The Supreme Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India22, held that “the 
other facet of Article 14 is that the reasonableness of a statute is to 
be judged on the basis of whether the State has sufficient material 
to support the rationale of the impugned legislation. If the reason 
given for the impugned legislation is not supported by any 
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material, such legislation can be struck down as arbitrary and 
violates Article 14 of the Constitution.”It is against the background 
of this settled precedent mandating presence of clear material on 
record that we must look at the remarks made by the Court in this 
case. In several instances where the State has provided data 
regarding education and the number of toilets, the Court 
acknowledged the fact that the data is not clear or that it has not 
been made available. In a serious situation such as this, where 
individuals are disenfranchised, the State must bear the burden of 
proving without any doubt that the legislation not only has a 
reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved, but also 
sufficient material must be placed on record to adjudge the 
rationale. In this case, the Court acted carelessly while treating the 
available data. In the author’s opinion, it was of utmost importance 
that the Court analyzed the exact percentage of people getting 
excluded from practicing their right to contest due to the 
amendment before deciding that the educational criteria constitutes 
a valid disqualification. 
Taking into account the other provisions like the mandate to have a 
toilet, the percentage of disenfranchised individuals will keep 
rising steadily. Education under Article 21A and a toilet with 
drainage and sewage capability are responsibilities of the State. Yet, 
the government has transformed its own failures into a burden that 
excludes the nation from contesting in elections. 
 
